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In 1937 R.H. Coase made a start with what much later proved to
be a new field of study in price theory in general, and in the
'theory of the firm' in particular: the explanation of the
division of coordination activities between firms and markets
in a market economy. At first, however, this start was
followed by a long period of silence. Its termination,in  the
196Os, was accelerated by a new pathbreaking publication by
C0ase.l
In the course of the 'sixties and 'seventies a number of more
or less rival approaches arose: the 'property rights'
approach, the 'law and economics' approach, the 'principal-
agent' approach, and 0-E. Williamson's "New Institutional
EconomicsVt (NIE) approach (Williamson 1975).2
This essay is meant as a critique of two of Williamson's basic
assumptions. Williamson builds a theoretical construction on
the basis of a number of building-blocks. Two of these,
'bounded rationality' and 'opportunism', are treated in this
paper. It will be argued that this combination of building-
blocks is a poor choice. Two objections will be raised against
it. On the one hand, it happens to be unnecessarily
*Erasmus University Rotterdam. This paper was funded by
the Faculty of Economics and Econometrics of the Free
University of Amsterdam as part of its research program "The
Development of the New Institutional Economics".
'Cease  1960. For a defense of this view on that particular
episode see Elzas 1998.
2Williamson 1975. He later substituted the epitheton
'Transaction Cost Economics' for NIE, reserving the latter
term for designating the much wider field of economic order
and organization in general. This change of names is not
followed in the text above, because the name NIE contrasts
Williamson's approach to the narrower field much better with
rival approaches than 'transaction cost economics' could do.
Transaction costs play an important part in all approaches to
this field, as they did in Cease's  founding work already. The
term NIE, however, was introduced by Williamson on purpose: he
wanted to express a relationship between his approach and
Commons's variety of the 'old' Institutionalism. See
Williamson 1975, p. 3.
.
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2complicated as a basis for the description of human behaviour
on markets and in firm-like organizations. Thus O&ham's  Razor
could be applied successfully. On the other hand, this
combination of building-blocks threatens to exclude an
essential element of human behaviour from the analysis, viz.
the element of trust. This leads us to the conclusion that
Williamson's combination of building-blocks could better be
dispensed with, if a superior alternative is available. Such a
superior alternative for the description of human behaviour as
a step towards the explanation of coordination activities in
the market economy has existed since the times of Richard
Cantillon and Adam Smith. Unknowingly (or at least without any
reference to these proto-classical authors) this alternative
was used by Coase (19371, and by others in their belated
following in Cease's footsteps. Therefore the paper concludes
with a plea for the explicit adoption of this proto-classical
combination of assumptions in this field of study.
1. On 'bounded rationality' (BR)
The first building-block of Williamson's theoretical
construction is the assumption of 'bounded rationality' (BR) .
Williamson derives the expression BR from Herbert Simon
(1957) . However, it remains unclear whether he attaches
exactly the same meaning to it as Simon does. For one thing,
the meaning Simon attaches himself to the term is not
unequivocally clear. For another, in the course of
Williamson's publications since 1973 (when he first introduced
Simon's expression into his own analysis) only one part of its
possible meaning to Simon is emphasized, thereby practically
neglecting the rest.3  W e shall not go into these
complications, because they are not really important for our
goal. To omit them, we shall define the assumption of BR in a
way most favourable to its usage in this field. To this end it
is better to refer to Simon's work directly, because his
conception of the content of the term BR is the broader one.
. 31n Williamson 1973 he gives the following description of
BR: "Bounded rationality refers to rate and storage limits on
the capacities of individuals to receive, store, retrieve, and
process information without error." (p. 317). As will be
explained in the text, this description omits the 'ignorance'
part of Simon's BR. Similar descriptions were found in
Williamson 1975 (p. 9), and 1985 (p. 46).
3Simon begins by judging the assumption of 'rational'  decision
making not to be very helpful for organization theory:
rlI do not intend to dispute the usefulness of the "ideal
type" of economic man for many problems of economic
analysis. But the specific problems with which
organization theory is concerned are of a character that
generally renders this particular idealization
inappropriate." (Simon, 1957, p. 197).
He discerns two barriers blocking the way to the 'rational'
decision making postulated by neo-classical price theory. One
is associated with "the rationality of more than one"  in
various game-like situations. Each of the parties involved
tries to predict the others's reactions to the range of his
potential next moves before, and in order to, making his
preferred choice among them. The neo-classical example is
oligopoly theory. Even if there is only one other party
involved, and the rules of the game restrict the number of
possible moves severely (as in chess), the whole 'tree' of
strategic moves from the beginning to the end of the game is
much too complicated for human computational capacity to
compute completely. This is the computational complexity
barrier to 'rational'  decision making, which is to be expected
in situations involving strategic behaviour.
The other barrier to 'rational' decision making is
uncertainty, or ignorance about the future. It can be ascribed
to incomplete information about 'the way the world works'. Man
is not omniscient and therefore he is not able to make fully
reliable predictions. Realizing this, he cannot decide his
moves perfectly 'rationally'.
The following quotation summarizes the two barriers to neo-
classical 'rational' decision-making discerned by Simon:
"It is only when one tries to understand the actual
mechanisms of decision-making - as distinguished from the
* classical concern with what a man would do if he shared
God's omniscience - that one appreciates that the central
problem in this kind of rational behavior is to obtain
information and to use that information in computations;
and that the entire mechanism of decision is molded by
,:
4information-processing considerations." (Simon 119561 ,
1982, Vol. 1, p. 237).
In this quotation the two differences between the assumed
circumstances of neo-classical 'rational' decision-making and
those of BR prove to be imperfect information and imperfect
information-processing. This raises the question whether it is
necessary, important, or even useful to distinguish between
these two elements of BR if it is applied for a description of
human behaviour in organizational contexts. Obviously, if this
were not the case, we could better treat them as a single
difference from 'rational' decision-making, thereby evading
the not very easy task of imputing any departure from
'rational' behaviour to either imperfect information or
imperfect information-processing.
On this issue Williamson (1985, p. 57, note 15) comes to our
help by pointing to what he judges to be a llsomewhat extreme
position" taken by Simon (1972, p. 170):
"What we refer to as "uncertaintyl'  in chess or theorem
proving, therefore, is uncertainty introduced into a
perfectly certain environment bY inability -
computational inability - to ascertain the structure of
that environment. But the result of the uncertainty,
whatever its source, is the same: approximation must
replace exactness in reaching a decision."
Thus, whether uncertainty is caused by imperfect information
input directly, or by its imperfect processing (as a
consequence of limits to human computational capacities), the
result is the same: human decision-making has to proceed in
conditions of uncertainty.' Although uncertainty may have two
separate causes, from the point of view of human decision-
making it is the one and only barrier to realizing neo-
classical 'rationality'. Its partitioning by Simon into the
two barriers of computational complexity and ignorance is
judged by him to be of no importance for the resulting.
'Note that Simon here uses the word 'uncertainty' also in
connection to the computational complexity barrier, .while  in
his 1957 publication he reserved this word for the ignorance-
about-the-future barrier.
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5difference between BR and neo-classical Irationality':
II . . . approximation must replace exactness..".
Uncertainty results from imperfect information input as such,
or from imperfect processing of the data. 'Perfect knowledge'
would result only if both were perfect. This being impossible,
however, perfect knowledge is unattainable. Thus in this
context 'uncertainty' and 'imperfect knowledge' may be used as
if they were synonyms. Therefore, the following conclusion is
warranted:
For applications in the theory of the firm there is no
important difference between using Simon's notion of BR or
using the more pedestrian notion that man is compelled to make
his decisions in a state of uncertainty or imperfect
knowledge. The merit of Simon's notion lies on another plane:
it makes clear that there could be two mutually independent
causes of this state, each in itself sufficient to produce it:
imperfect information input and imperfect information
processing. However, as information input for the decision-
maker outside games like chess is imperfect anyway, there is
no good reason to prefer BR over 'uncertainty' (or 'imperfect
knowledge') as an assumption in this field.
Moreover, there is a good semantic reason for eschewing the
term BR: 'rationality' has an unwelcome connotation. Simon
experienced this himself, as witnessed by a digression he
makes on the difference between BR and 'irrationality' (Simon
1957, p. 200). Clearly, his choice of the term BR was strongly
influenced by the habit in neo-classical circles of calling
the perfectly informed decision-making by the agents in neo-
classical theory 'rational' decision-making. In that context
the word 'rational' did not mean anything else than that
agents maximize their profit, utility or whatever else their
objective may be. They are able to do so, given their
objective function on the one hand and the complete
information concerning their possibilities on the other.
Indeed, under those circumstances it would be *irrational' not
to ho so. This would mean that agents to some extent ignored
their own objective functions, by definition a stupid thing to
do. Thus, 'rationality' here does not mean anything else than
that the situation for the individual decision-maker is
assumed to be completely defined.
6The 'rational' consumer, for instance, decides to buy the very
combination of consumption goods that results in maximal
utility, given his subjective utility function, his budget,
and the prices of all existing consumption goods in his
ceteris paribus world. Given this situation and the postulate
of utility maximizing this is the only possible decision to
make. It is a tautological description of his 'choice': the
assumed striving for utility maximization in a situation of
perfect information about all relevant data (perfect
information input) and the assumption that the necessary
calculations do not exceed the individual's computation
capacities (perfect processing of the data), could only result
in the one combination of purchases chosen. There is no real
rationality involved in this agent's decision-making, only a
formal or tautological lrationalityl.
Against this historical background Simon's choice of the term
BR in the 1950s is perfectly understandable. It is a
consequence of his endeavours to describe real-world
situations, in which decisions have to be made without perfect
knowledge, and to contrast these with the neo-classical
description of decision-making, current at the time. However,
anyone not acquainted with this background could be thrown
into confusion by the term BR. This is a secondary reason to
substitute 'imperfect knowledge' or 'uncertainty' for it. For
both reasons Williamson (using BR from the 1970s) would have
done better by doing so.
2. On 'opportunism
The second building-block of Williamson's theoretical
construction he alternately calls 'opportunism' and 'self-
interest seeking with guile'. It emphasizes the unreliability
of man in his dealings with others of his kind. With the help
of this assumption Williamson wants to explain specific market
failures, various special arrangements of market transactions,
and specific patterns of internal organization. It will be
argued here that the addition "with guilel'  to the old notion
of -self-interest seeking is completely superfluous in these
connections, and could even be an obstacle to the explanation
of human behaviour.
To demonstrate this, let us distinguish two situations.
Firstly, there is perfect knowledge in the economy. In that
case every agent - whether acting as a potential buyer or as a
potential seller, whether doing so on markets for consumer or
for producer goods, - lives in a glass house. However
egotistic or even wicked he may be, under a regime of perfect
knowledge or information he knows fully well that all other
agents are as completely informed about his conduct as he
himself is. So cheating or any other kind of opportunistic
behaviour would make him a pariah in society, because such
misbehaviour would be detected at once.5  As it would be
communicated to the whole world costlessly and perfectly,
there is no other society he could flee to without being found
out immediately as a cheater from abroad, ostracizing him in
any society. Not keeping to the rules or sticking to one's
words would be completely contra-productive, as viewed from
his own self-interest seeking perspective. Thus, it is
absolutely certain that in this situation man, as a self-
interest seeking being, will eschew such behaviour in this
situation, whatever his inclinations may be.6
Secondly, assume a society with imperfect knowledge. Then some
acts will remain hidden to others, for the time being or
possibly forever. In this situation. self-interest seeking
could produce cheating or any other kind of opportunistic
behaviour. Whether an agent really commits an opportunistic
act depends, among other things, on his character, education,
his attitude towards risk, and on his feelings towards the
potential victims of his considered misbehaviour. It will be
clear, however, that now self-interest seeking and opportunis-
tic behaviour do not exclude each other, as they did in the
first case. As a consequence of this, an individual economic
agent does well to be alert to the possibility that in his
dealings with others he may happen to meet the wrong person in
'The more literally the regime of perfect knowledge is
interpreted, the less room will be left for opportunistic
behaviour. The extreme case is that every agent is assumed not
only to be able to detect opportunistic behaviour of all
others, but also to do so without any cost. Thus, without any
loss of time, such behaviour would become absolutely
impossible. No agent would be able to fool any other agent for
any time.
6From  this follows that self-interest seeking' man is
assumed to be in control of his impulses.
8this respect; or that one of his till now correctly-behaving
business partners could change his behaviour in the future,
for instance on the impulse of an adverse change in his own
circumstances. Yet this does not mean that nobody can be tru-
sted anymore at any time. In other words, economic agents are
wrong in ascribing guile to all others, for there are still
many who can be trusted in normal circumstances. Mistrusting
everybody else in all circumstances is clearly not in the
self-interest of the individual agent. General mistrust would
preclude many a potential business agreement. Conquering
mistrust by inserting various extra clauses into a contract
would be very expensive. Moreover, it is technically
impossible to write a 'perfect contract', for the imperfect
information input regime precludes perfect foresight. Mistrust
of employees could be counterproductive and costly.
Thus, the conclusion seems warranted that Williamson
exaggerates by ascribing opportunism to all economic agents,
and hence to mankind. Following eighteenth-century authors
like Cantillon and Adam Smith would have been a better choice.
Man is a self-interest seeking animal, so that opportunity
could make the thief.' Here is a case for using O&ham's
Razor: cut "guile"  away from Williamson's second building-
block. Self-interest seeking, the more general assumption, re-
mains. Combined with the modified first building-block -
imperfect knowledge (uncertainty, imperfect information
output) - this creates the possibility for opportunistic
behaviour, without making it an inevitable result for all
cases in which human behaviour is not monitored directly and
perfectly.
If this critique is valid, Williamson's specific derivation of
'market failure' from a combination of factors (among which BR
and opportunism) has to be given up in this form. That is no
'Strictly speaking, the expression tlself-interest  seeking
animal" is not quite accurate in Smith's case. All animals
appear to be self-interest seeking, according to the Wealth of
Nations (WON), but man distinguishes himself from all other
animals by another attribute: "the  propensity to truck,
barter, and exchange one thing for another" (WON 1.ii.l).
For Cantillon's  notions of man's self-interest seeking and the
inevitableness of deciding under uncertainty, see his "Essay
on the Nature of Trade in General", Part I, chapter xiii.
9loss, because their substitutes 'imperfect knowledge' and
'self-interest seeking' suffice. When combined with other
assumptions (such as few potential buyers and sellers on a
market) they could also lead to market failures.*
3. Testing the applicability of O&ham's  Razor
A long period of inactivity in this field followed after Coase
(1937) had made a beginning with the exploration of the field
of 'firm versus market'. This ended rather abruptly in the
early 196Os, when at last publications in this field began to
form a stream. However, the next incident already lurked
around the corner. The newly and belatedly developing study of
'allocation by markets versus allocation by firms' gradually
became dominated by Williamson's approach, named by himself
"New Institutional Economics11 (Commons's institutionalism
being regarded as the old one). Seen from the perspective of
the continuity of assumptions about man (a continuity that was
remarkably strong in the sequence Cantillon-Smith-Marshall-
Coase), Williamson's approach may be typified as a cuckoo in
the nest of economics.
Remarkable as this development is in itself, there is the even
more remarkable fact that Williamson's work met with little
resistance from the more orthodox circles. Williamson's basic
assumptions were subjected to debate at conferences held in
the late 1980s and early 1990s on New Institutional Economics
(NIE)  and its relations to old Institutionalism and to Law and
Economics, as may be gleaned from accounts in the Journal of
Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) .' Much more
*Besides, Williamson did not make a fortunate choice by
adopting the expression "market failure". With Arrow's
approach to the market system, in which this expression fits,
Demsetz had taken issue already when Williamson adopted it in
a 1971 article, and again in his 1975 book: see Demsetz 1969.
To summarize Demsetz's  objection: the word "failure" wrongly
suggests that the market system of the real world fails by not
being as complete and as perfect as the neo-classical fairy-
tale market system. Demsetz speaks of a "nirvana approach" to
the study of the market system (19691,  1989, p. 3.
'For instance in JITE  1990 and 1993. A remarkable example
is to be found in the latter. At one of the conferences
Richard Posner, one of the leading representatives of the 'law
and economics' approach, presented a paper, highly critical of
10
attention, however, was devoted to other subjects.
One of them concerned the implications reached by NIE, compa-
red to those reached by the Law and Economics School. Friend
and foe agreed that in this respect the differences between
the two were not very great, and that those encountered are
more ones of emphasis than of principle. They were not judged
to be fundamental." This conclusion is in accordance with the
position defended in the previous section. A case for applying
Ockham's Razor ought to be one in which implications of the
'shaved' theory are not changed: only superfluous parts of the
assumptions are cut away with this medieval razor. This
happens to be the case here.
4. Conclusions: why bother?
There are several reasons for bothering about Williamson's
choice of basic assumptions about man's behaviour, but we can
summarize them as one big objection: it leads (and has already
led) to unnecessary confusion within the profession.
His adoption of Simon's BR assumption introduced unnecessary
complications into the description of, human decision-making
behaviour in the modern theory of the firm. When Simon
Williamson's NIE (Posner 1993). Coase, who may be regarded as
the founding father of both rival approaches, came to
Williamson's defence (Coase 1993). Although defending and
praising him, he admits his own doubts concerning Williamson's
basic assumptions:
"My discussions with researchers in this field has made
it clear to me that Williamson's influence has been
immense. In a real sense, transaction cost economics,
through his writing and teaching is his creation. Posner
objects to some concepts espoused by Williamson such as
"bounded rationality". I also have reservations about
this concept as I do to any economic concept that
includes the word "rationall'.  I was also doubtful about
the validity of Williamson's treatment of tlopportunism'
as a significant rationale for vertical integration (not,. of course, as an explanation of other contractual
arrangements). But these are differences that will be ,
cleared up by further discussion and, above all, by more
empirical work. Whatever the result, Williamson's basic
approach will be unaffected." (Cease,  1993, p. 98).
loSee, for instance, Posner 1993.
.I’,
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observes that both barriers to 'rational' decision-making
ultimately have one and the same consequence, Williamson
belittles this valuable observation by calling it a "somewhat
extreme position". It even seems as if he has a strong
preference for the maintenance of unnecessary complications.
Williamson increased confusion by the unnecessary introduction
of 'opportunism' ('self-interest with guile') instead of good
old 'self-interest seeking' as the behavioural assumption. It
is imaginable that his adoption of the rather complicated BR
assumption confused him too much to be aware of this, but in
fact the explicit assumption of guile as a human "attribute"
(Williamson 1998, p. 31) is completely superfluous in
combination with BR or any other assumption stating that man
has to make his decisions in a perennial condition of
imperfect knowledge.
Let us conclude with an explanation of the remarkable fact
that Cantillon and Smith made a more fortunate choice of
assumptions than Williamson (or even Simon) did two centuries
later. This fact looks more remarkable than it really is. As
explained in section 1 above, Simon had a strong urge to
contrast his view of human decision-making conditions with the
neo-classical assumption of perfect knowledge. In the 1950's
neo-classical theory of the firm was still the dominant theory
of the firm, and therefore this was the assumption he had to
contest. Neither Cantillon nor Smith were confronted with this
neo-classical 'tautologic' and therefore could choose their
assumption regarding human knowledge more quietly.
In this respect a parallel may be observed between Simon and
Coase. When Coase (1937) ventured his exploratory expedition
into the terra incognita of the division of coordination
activities between firms and markets in a market economy, he
succeeded in penetrating this field by adopting the twin
assumptions of transaction costs on the market and managing
costs in the firm. Behind these assumptions lies the same
notion as that of our proto-classical authors: man is not.
omniscient. Why did not Coase state this to begin with?" The
'lExpressions  of the idea of imperfect knowledge are to be
found at least five times in text plus notes of Cease's  1937
article. However, transaction costs are not explicitly
12
answer is similar to that given in Simon's case: he had to
fight a formidable adversary, formalized neo-classical theory,
which was just achieving its mainstream position at the time.
So he was forced to choose more directed assumptions.
Nevertheless, it may be said of Coase and of Simon (and in
Simon's slipstream partly of Williamson too) that at least
implicitly they made assumptions similar to the proto-
classical assumptions of imperfect knowledge and self-interest
seeking, even if they did not realize it themselves at the
time. In that respect they remind one of Moliere's Le Bourgois
Gentilhomme  (16701, Mr. Jourdain, who discovered that he had
spoken prose for over forty years already "without knowing
it".
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